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agricultural  legislation  and  attempts  to  elaborate  the  ways  that  the  impact  of  the  U.S. 
subsidy systems radiates throughout the economy. Lastly, the paper attempts to analyze 


























Commerce  Clause  authority  and  using  a  complex  toolbox  of  legislative  and  regulatory 
innovations, the federal legislature has enormous power to transform the types of behavior 
that people will perceive as self‐interested throughout our economy and thus how those 







Given  the  dynamic  nature  of  our  economy,  legislation  designed  to  target  one  problem 
inevitably  causes  unexpected  changes  in  other  places.  The  “law  of  unintended 
consequences,” as Robert Merton phrased it,1 is among the primary reasons that legislation 


















funding  preventable  environmental  degradation,  deepening  our  fossil‐fuel  dependence, 
accelerating America’s obesity and diabetes epidemics, and contributing billions of dollars 
to  annual  healthcare  costs.  Internationally,  American  subsidies  have  upset  commodity 
prices,  pushed  countless  farmers  out  of  work,  fueled  political  instability,  and  even 


























subsidies  have  managed  to  persist  as  a  federal  policy  despite  considerable  political 
opposition, with specific attention given to the incentives facing legislators and regulators.  
Section  I  provides  a  brief  historical  account  of  corn  subsidies  and  related 
agricultural  regulations.  Section  II  examines  the  current  administration  of  federal  corn 
subsidies;  the  incentives  that  subsidies  create  for  corn  growers,  food  producers, 
manufacturers,  and  consumers;  and  several  salient  healthcare  and  environmental  costs 
these subsidies have imposed. Section III examines those features of our federal political 
landscape  that  make  effective  legislation  and  regulation  in  this  area  such  a  formidable 
challenge. Finally, I conclude with the observation that restoring reasonable price signals in   6 
our food system will require us to move away from deficiency payment systems—and that 










year  farm  bill.  Historically,  federal  agricultural  legislation  was  concerned  with  three 















USDA  as  the  “people’s  department.”5  As  in  the  Congressional  response  to  the  Great 
Depression, protecting family farmers was often one explicit justification for agricultural 
legislation.6  Even  as  technological  innovation  and  commercialization  transformed  the 
farming  into  an  industrial  practice,  this  rhetoric  has  retained  political  currency  and 
continues to frame agricultural debates to the present.7  
Early  agricultural  legislation  focused  on  ways  that  scientific  and  technological 
advancements could increase productivity and output. The 1862 creation of the United 
States  Department  of  Agriculture  (USDA)  and  the  Morrill  Land  Grant  College  Act,  for 





















of  1914  formed  an  official  partnership  between  land‐grant  universities  and  the  USDA, 
known as the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA).9 This Act established a 
system  whereby  land‐grant  universities  received  federal  funds  to  invest  in  agricultural 
education  and  extension  work,  while  NIFA  helped  ensure  those  funds  were  spent  in 
accordance  with  USDA  priorities.10  With  the  full  support  of  Congress  and  the  USDA, 
technological  advancements  enabled  massive  increases  in  productivity,  leading  to 
consolidation  and  larger  farm  operations.  Ironically,  while  public  rhetoric  surrounding 
agricultural policy often invokes the family farmer,11 federal policy has proven unable to 
stave off commercial farming and the decline of the family farm.12 In fact, as Brian Riedl of 
the  conservative  and  libertarian  Heritage  Foundation  described  in  a  New  York  Times 
online  discussion,  “Setting  aside  the  Norman  Rockwell  imagery,  farm  subsidies  are 
America’s largest corporate welfare program.”13  
Another  recurring  objective  of  U.S.  agricultural  legislation  has  been  the  need  to 
insulate farmers and the food supply from excessive uncertainty created by both seasonal 









2010,  available  at  http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/21/do‐farm‐subsidies‐protect‐
national‐security/put‐a‐cap‐on‐subsides‐to‐big‐farms. (“Many Democrats who wrap themselves in rhetoric 
about saving the little guy are equally timid when it comes to reigning in mega‐farm subsidies.”). 




















and  numerous  other  state  and  federal  agencies.  All  told,  food  safety  system  alone  is 





http://www.cftc.gov/About/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc.html;  see  also  Investopedia  Financial 














impossible  for  an  agency  like  the  USDA,  for  example,  to  take  healthcare  costs  or 
environmental  factors  into  account  in  determining  how  subsidy  payments  could  more 
effectively be allocated.19 Although some commentators have pointed out the benefits of 
regulatory specialization, fragmentation has been a recurring source of criticisms since the 






















































111‐221  –  Agriculture,  Rural  Development,  Food  and  Drug  Administration,  and  Related  Agencies 
Appropriations Bill, 2011. 
25  History  of  Agricultural  Price‐Support  and  Adjustment  Programs,  1933‐84  Background  for  1985  Farm 






and  redistribution  scheme  in  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  was  an  unconstitutional 
reallocation of property. The Court further ruled that the regulation of agriculture in this 
manner was a usurpation of state powers that violated of the Commerce Clause.26  
Agricultural  problems  persisted,  and  public  support  mounted  for  some  type  of 
agricultural support system. Spurred by Roosevelt’s 1937 court‐packing plan, the Supreme 
Court began backing away from its opposition to New Deal legislation. In 1938, Congress 
successfully  passed  the  Agricultural  Adjustment  Act  of  1938,  which  instituted  the  farm 
subsidy policies first introduced in the 1933 legislation and opened the way for subsequent 
farm bills.27 The 1933 legislation provided mandatory price supports for corn, cotton, and 
wheat  that  would  guarantee  a  baseline  level  of  production  and  keep  supply  levels  in 
alignment with market demand.28 The government accomplished this by making sure the 










released  when  yields  were  low.30  The  act  also  continued  to  rely  on  soil  conservation 
techniques.31 The 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act remains the permanent background 
law of commodity programs and farm income supports, and it reverts into effect if at any 




The  Agricultural  Act  of  1949,33  in  amended  form,  is  known  as  the  permanent 
legislation, and like the 1938 Act and the 1948 Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 
remains  part  of  the  background  agricultural  law  to  the  present  day.34  The  1949  Act 
provided legal authorization to the CCC to reallocate surplus foods, including corn and 
other staples, to school lunch programs, poor Americans, and internationally to friendly 




























contained  a  combination  of  federal  commodity  and  farm‐support  policies.  The  Act 
































and  under  Nixon’s  Secretary  of  Agriculture,  Earl  Butz,  took  up  this  cause  within  the 
administration,  even  arguing  that  overproduction  and  a  resultant  drop  in  the  price  of 
















43  The  National  Family  Farm  Coalition  (NFFC),  King  Corn  Fact  Sheet,  available  at 
http://www.nffc.net/Learn/Fact%20Sheets/King%20Corn%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.   16 
be reduced through free trade.44 With rejoinders to farmers to “get big or get out” and to 
grow  corn  “fencerow  to  fencerow,”  Butz  helped  usher  in  a  new  era  of  agricultural 
production. Butz dismantled supply management policies and sold off government storage 
bins and food reserves, and, rather than subjecting the agricultural sector to market forces 
as  his  public  comments  proposed,  Butz  oversaw  the  implementation  of  a  new  set  of 
industry‐favorable  market  regulations,  the  system  of  target  prices  and  deficiency 
payments, where commodity producers received payments anytime the market price fell 












provisions  of  these  bills  support  the  proposition  that  Congress  was  using  subsidies  to 
                                                        
44 Id. 











1985  and  served  to  reduce  commodity  prices  and  income  supports  for  farmers.49 
Amendments to the 1985 act50 changed subsidy acreage base calculations and gave USDA 
discretion  to  require  cross‐compliance  for  feed  grains  rather  than  mandating  them.51 





















crops  such  as  corn,  by  reducing  payments  based  on  acreage,  and  by  extending  the 
expiration of the deficit reducing aspects of OBRA and FACT through 1998.55 
In  1996,  Congress  passed  the  omnibus  Federal  Agriculture  Improvement  and 
Reform Act (FAIR), known also as the Freedom to Farm Act.56 The bill was touted as a move 






However,  the  attempt  to  overhaul  the  deficiency  payment  system  proved  rather 










56  Federal  Agriculture  Improvement  and  Reform  Act  of  1996  (P.L.  104‐127),  available  at 
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/about/offices/legis/96frmbil.html. 
57 Id. See also The review of the 1996 farm legislation in the United States, Food and Agriculture Organization 





payment  system  continued  to  receive  per‐acreage  ‘transition’  Production  Flexibility 
Contracts  (PFCs)  which  were  decoupled  from  market  supply  determinations  but  which 
remained  linked  to  amounts  received  under  the  deficiency  payment  system.61  As 










discourage  Congress  from  following  through  with  its  deregulatory  push.  In  2002,  the 
newest  omnibus  farm  bill,  the  Farm  Security  and  Rural  Investment  Act  of  2002, 
reintroduced a system of deficiency payments similar to those eliminated in 1996, this time 
under  the  name  counter‐cyclical  payments  (CCPs)  which  pay  farmers  the  difference 
                                                        
60  See  Michael  Bell,  ed.,  FARMING  FOR  US  ALL:  PRACTICAL  AGRICULTURE  &  THE  CULTIVATION  OF  SUSTAINABILITY, 
Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, at Note 3, p.255 (June 22, 2004); Mary Burfisher and Jeffrey Hopkins, Farm 
Payments:Decoupled Payments Increase Households' Well‐Being, Not Production, USDA ERS Amber Waves: 













the  record  profits  that  farmers  had  been  earning.69  The  Act  adjusted  eligibility 
requirements  and  crop  insurance  programs,70  and  retained  provisions  continued  to 
provide direct payments and counter‐cyclical payments at precisely the same rates as the 
2002 Farm Bill did between 2004 and 2007.71 Its passage was somewhat controversial and 
reveals  the  shifting  political  considerations  now  bearing  on  the  continuation  of  U.S. 
commodity subsidies. The United Nations and the World Trade Organization, joined by the 
EU,  Brazil,  Argentina,  Canada,  and  others,  released  a  report  criticizing  U.S.  agricultural 































of  costs  associated  with  this  legislation,  corn  subsidies  cannot  be  viewed  simply  as 
recurring payments from the federal treasury to farmers. Farm bill subsidies represent a 
much more comprehensive reconfiguration of incentives: they are a game‐changing event 


















attributable  to  overconsumption  of  corn‐based  food  products  and  corn‐fed  animal 





primary  agricultural  and  food  policy  tool  of  the  federal  government.”76  Corn  subsidies 
affect the price of nearly everything in the American food supply. This Part begins with a 
description of the current administration of corn subsidies and how those affect prices, 








subsidies  lead  to  market  distortions  throughout  our  food  system.  First,  corn  subsidies 
directly reduce the manufacturing costs of all corn‐containing products (an almost endless 
list including refined sugars, corn syrup, corn starch, coloring, etc.) and the costs of corn‐












“The  crop‐specific  deficiency  payment  rate  was  based  on  the 
difference  between  the  legislatively  set  target  price  and  the  lower 
national  average  market  price  during  a  specified  time.  The  total 
payment was equal to the payment rate, multiplied by a farm’s eligible 
payment acreage and the program payment yield established for the 
particular  farm.  In  the  latter  years  of  the  program,  farmers  could 
receive  up  to  one‐half  of  their  projected  deficiency  payments  at 
program  signup.  If  actual  deficiency  payments,  which  were 







deficiency  payments.  Although  Congress  nominally  eliminated  deficiency  payment 
program with the 1996 legislation,78 the counter‐cyclical payments (CCPs) reintroduced in 
2002  operate  in  essentially  the  same  way,  by  paying  farmers  the  difference  when  the 
market price for a commodity fall below the target price.79  
Secondly,  and  without  regard  to  annual  fluctuations  in  price  or  yield,  direct 
payments of a fixed amount are available to commodity producers on a per bushel basis. 
Direct  payments  are  available  even  if  the  market  price  is  above  the  CCP  target.  If  the 
market price is below the CCP target, the farmer will receive the difference between the 








an  increase  in  the  supply  of  corn  to  drive  prices  down.  Production,  one  would  expect, 
should  only  continue  up  to  the  point  that  the  market  price  is  larger  than  the  cost  of 






















The  third  major  component  of  the  federal  agricultural  support  system  is  the 
marketing loan program. “New Deal. This program was designed to provide short‐term 
financing to pay farm expenses before crops were sold, but it has morphed into simply 






University,  available  at  http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/PB09‐01SweeteningPotFeb09.pdf  (“GDAE 
estimated  that  corn  and  soybeans  were  priced  23%  and  15%  below  their  average  production  costs, 
respectively, in the nine‐year period following the 1996 Farm Bill, 1997‐2005.”). 
85 Chris Edwards and Tad DeHaven, Farm Subsidies at Record Levels, supra note 61 at 6 (citing Commission 
on  21st  Century  Production  Agriculture,  Directions  for  Future  Farm  Policy:  The  Role  of  Government  in 







government’s  marketing  loan.  On  top  of  this  de  facto  subsidy,  taxpayers  also  bear  the 
expense  of  maintaining  the  government’s  commodity  stockpiles.87  The  marketing  loan 
program  also  makes  a  second  option,  loan  deficiency  payments  (LDPs),  available  to 
farmers,  which  enables  farmers  to  receive  the  subsidy  without  actually  structuring  the 
payment as a secured nonrecourse loan.88  
Together the total cost these programs between 1995 and 2009 exceeded $73.8 



































factory  farming  industries,  especially  to  keep  artificially  low  the  prices  of 
corn  and  soybeans,  largely  used  as  farmed  animal  feed.  These  large 
corporations receive taxpayer money, and while this does filter down to a 





92  J.K.  Bourne,  Biofuels:  Green  Dreams,  National  Geographic  Magazine,  Oct.  2007  p.  41,  available  at 
http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2007/10/biofuels/biofuels‐text. 
93 Michael Pollan, THE OMNIVORES DILEMMA, Penguin Press; First edition at 103 (April 11, 2006). 
94  Assessing  Changing  Food  Consumption  Patterns,  National  Research  Council  (U.S.).  Committee  on  Food 
Consumption Patterns, Assembly of Life Sciences (U.S.), Appendix A at 58‐59, Washington D.C. (2001).   28 
Take corn subsidies, for example. Simply put, government subsidizing of corn 
subsidizes  the  factory  farm  animal  production  system,  which  is  largely 

















Philpott  estimated  that  between  1997  and  2005  the  combined  subsidies  passed  on  to 














As  Heather  Schoonover  and  Mark  Muller  have  noted,    “The  ability  of  fast‐food 


















Policy  Contributes  to  Obesity  6  (2006),  available  at 
http://www.healthobservatory.org/library.cfm?RefID=80627. 
100 A. Hope Jahren and Rebecca A. Kraft, Carbon and nitrogen stable isotopes in fast food: Signatures of corn 








end  consumers  for  a  broad  range  of  HFCS‐containing  foods.  Benforado,  Hanson,  and 
Yosifon made the following observation:  
“While it would be intuitive to imagine this as a good thing for the 


















1645,  1792‐93  (2004)  (examining  the  government's  failure  to  recognize  the  connection  among  corn 
subsidies, high fructose corn syrup, and obesity) (citing Michael Pollan, THE OMNIVORES DILEMMA, supra note 
93  at  46;  James  Bovard,  Archer  Daniels  Midland:  A  Case  Study  in  Corporate  Welfare,  at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa‐241.html (Sept. 26, 1995)). 




























Policy  Contributes  to  Obesity  6  (2006),  available  at 
http://www.healthobservatory.org/library.cfm?RefID=80627. 


















































actually  subsidizing  it,  by  writing  farmers  a  check  for  every  bushel  of  corn  they  can 
grow."120 In part because of these subsidies, farmers in the US produce 500 more calories 
per person every day than did in the early 1970s, and Americans consume an additional 
200  of  those  calories.121  And  many  of  those  calories  are  from  corn,122  corn‐fed  animal 




































































David  R.  Linebacka;  Sanford  A.  Millera;  Theresa  A.  Nicklasa;  Gary  A.  Weavera;  John  S.  Whitea.  A  Critical 
Examination of the Evidence Relating High Fructose Corn Syrup and Weight Gain, Critical Reviews in Food 












Association  continue  to  emphasize  the  need  for  continued  epidemiological  studies.140 
Irrespective  of  that  debate  and  the  relative  harms  of  cane  sugar  and  HFCS,  there  is 
overwhelming and indisputable evidence that HFCS has contributed to a major increase in 





in  Women,  Press  Release  (Aug.  24,  2004),  available  at  http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press‐
releases/archives/2004‐releases/press08242004.html.  See  also  Frank  B.  Hu,  MD  Sugar‐Sweetened 
Beverages, Weight Gain, and Incidence of Type 2 Diabetes in Young and Middle‐Aged Women, Journal of 
American Medical Association. Aug. 25, 2004; 292(8): 927‐934. 











By  some  estimates,  healthcare  costs  for  obesity  and  for  weight‐related  diabetes 
exceed  $147  billion  annually.142  The  Society  of  Actuaries  Committee  on  Life  Insurance 






within  a  normal  weight  range,146  and  increasingly  these  costs  are  footed  by  taxpayers 
through  government  healthcare  programs.147  In  his  article,  A  Rotten  System,  William 






















Corn  production  is  an  extremely  land‐  and  resource‐dependent  industry,  and  as  John 
Mackay wrote, “By focusing solely on making food as cheap as possible, we have often 




cost  of  oil.  Gareth  Collins  has  further  documented  that  “[m]odern  farming  practices 




It  would  be  too  massive  an  undertaking  to  catalog  all  of  the 
socioeconomic,  public  health,  and  environmental  impacts  to  which 
commodity  subsidies  contribute.  It  is  also  an  oversimplification  to 














152  Carrie  Lowry  La  Seur  and  Adam  D.K.  Abelkop,  Forty  Years  After  NEPA’s  Enactment,  It  Is  Time  for  a 
Comprehensive Farm Bill Impact Statement, HARVARD L. & POLICY REV. 201, 204 (2010).   39 


















to‐fencerow  production,  incentivizing  fertilizer  dependence,  oil‐dependent  industrial 
farming techniques, and does not provide farmers any incentive to rotate crops to take 
advantage of natural efficiencies. And without pressure to keep costs below the market 
price,  farmers’  dependency  on  fossil  fuels  is  encouraged  even  beyond  the  already 
unsustainable levels stipulated through market pricing mechanisms. 
















Somewhat  surprisingly,  the  USDA  has  never  been  required  to  offer  a  full 























that  corn  is  consumed  domestically,  converted  into  ethanol,  or  dedicated  to  meat 















162  World  of  Corn  2010:  Meeting  the  Challenge  of  Production.  National  Corn  Growers  Association  2010, 
available at http://ncga.com/files/pdf/worldofcorn2010.pdf. 
163  ERS  USDA  Briefing  Room,  Corn:  Trade,  available  online  at 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/corn/trade.htm (last visited March 21, 2011). 











“Instead  of  making  any  gains,  the  Philippines  has  lost  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  farming  jobs  since  joining  the  W.T.O.  Its  modest 







underscoring,  among  other  things,  how  crucial  the  political  economy  of  food  remains 
among many of the world’s people.166 The problem goes far beyond simply putting strain 
on family farmers and indigenous populations. Displacing farmers swells the number of 














around  the  world  and  make  it  harder  for  farmers  to  sustain  themselves  and  their 
families.168  
This  is  not  just  a  problem  in  the  abstract.  The  U.N.  and  a  number  of  its  trade 
partners have at various times indicated their dissatisfaction with U.S. subsidies, and these 
programs have been characterized as protectionist, disruptive to free trade, and even, at 




[t]he  poorer  we  get.’”171  William  Eubanks  summarized  the  emerging  global  consensus 








168  “When  subsides  lead  to  increased  production  with  little  increase  in  consumption,  as  is  typical  with 
agricultural commodities . . . [the result is] lower prices for producers, lower incomes for farmers, and more 
poverty among poor farmers in the Third world.” William Eubanks, A Rotten System, supra note 114 at 234 









transfer  of  wealth  to  sophisticated  institutional  investors  while  making  food  less 




unrest  throughout  the  developing  world.175  The  cost  of  a  spike  in  food  costs,  whether 






extent  to  which  agricultural  prices  and  unemployment  more  generally  can  quickly 
transform into civil unrest significant social uprisings.177 The hostility and political unrest 



























Free‐market  advocates  and  libertarians  have  long  decried  the  market  distortions  and 
inefficiencies that corn subsidies create. House Speaker John Boehner has compared the 
farm  bill  to  a  “slush  fund.”181  Similarly,  opposition  from  liberal  and  progressive 
organizations is increasingly vocal and has coalesced around their environmental impact, 
the  unintended  healthcare  consequences,  and  the  fact  that  the  nation’s  wealthiest 
corporations  receive  a  disproportionate  share  of  governmental  subsidies.182  Even  the 






subsidies,  Wired  Magazine,  Issue  12.01,  Jan.  2004,  available  at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/12.01/view.html?pg=5. 
180 Id. 






Legislative  drift—the  process  by  which  legislation  grows  out‐of‐touch  with  its 
original purposes—is central to any honest attempt to answer this question. Emergency 
subsidies made sense as measures to stabilize price and supply of corn and other grains 
during  the  Great  Depression  and  the  shortages  of  the  1970s,  but  these  emergency 





modify  our  system  of  crop  subsidization  and  its  consequences  in  accordance  with 




W.  Bush  actually  threatened  to  veto  the  most  recent  Farm  Bill  in  2008  for  unfairly 
redistributing tax money and distorting public trade, but the Senate rejected subsidy caps 
and  responded  to  the  veto  threat  with  a  79‐14  vote  in  favor  of  the  existing  form.185 
Incidents such as this give rise to a serious concern that senators’ dependence on campaign 
                                                        






contributions  and  lobbying  money  matters  more  than  the  policy  preferences  of  their 
constituency and even more than party loyalties. 
The  persistence  of  this  legislation  can  actually  shine  some  light  into  the  most 







addresses  the  narrowness  of  the  statutory  authority  given  the  relevant  agencies  to 
implement food policy and the coordination problems that regulatory balkanization have 
produced in this area. Part B considers the structural features of Congress and the Senate, 










government  action  and  to  the  development  of  more  reasonable  food  policy.187  The 





they  are  discrete  produces  inconsistency  across  agencies,  duplicates  activities,  and 
enhances  coordination  costs.  This  diminishes  accountability,  and  more  subtly,  it  places 
blinders around administrators and limits the possible factors and courses of action that 
any one agency can take into consideration.189  
A  cross‐agency  resolution  mechanism  would  offer  one  possible  fix,  but  such  an 
approach  would  likely  encounter  administrative  law  problems  and,  to  the  extent  that 
considerable  power  were  transferred,  would  likely  face  resistance  in  Congress.190 





























legal  requirement  to  desist  from  any  of  the  environmental  harms  it  identified.194  At 
present, there is no requirement that the USDA take into account the back‐end healthcare 
costs  that  are  created  through  its  existing  commodity  programs,  but  if  NEPA  litigation 
offers  any  guidance,  such  a  requirement  would  have  to  assume  a  different  statutory 
framework. 
Closely related to this problem of fragmentation is the degree of internal constraint 























things,  that,  “the  rise  of  the  administrative  state  has  made  unchecked  discretion  an 
anomaly in the law, and a phenomenon to be viewed with suspicion.”197 In other words, the 
rise  of  the  administrative  state  is  a  story  of  empowering  a  large  government  entity  to 
regulate in the public interest while at their same time constricting their decision‐making 
abilities through judicial oversight and narrow statutory interpretation.198 
























disease.201  The  Wall  Street  Journal  similarly  speculated  that  industry  pressures  are 
responsible  for  the  failure  of  the  USDA  under  President  Obama  to  require  an 
environmental  impact  statement  to  consider  the  impact  of  its  decision  to  permit  the 
planting  of  genetically  modified,  bioengineered  alfalfa.202  Another  recurrent  complaint 




previous  USDA  publications,  but  that  they  still  failed  to  reflect  the  scientific  consensus 
about what a healthy diet entails.204 The researchers see this failure as likely related to the 




























Farm  Bill  legislation  and  occasionally  appear  before  Congress  regarding  its  authorizing 
statutes, their willingness to testify adversely to the interests of their clientele, particularly 
when  their  agency’s  jobs  are  potentially  at  stake,  creates  a  conflict  of  interests  that 




































the  agricultural  committee  with  the  strongest  economic  ties  to  farm  states,  tend  to   54 
predominate through to the bills’ final versions.208 These problems are both rendered more 
significant by the fact that the Farm Bill is largely viewed—by both representatives and 
their  constituents  alike—as  purely  agricultural  legislation  and  not,  more  accurately,  as 
affecting  the  health,  welfare,  and  environmental  interests  of  a  broad  cross‐section  of 
Americans.  
The  Senate,  for  example,  has  separate  committees  for  Agriculture,  Nutrition  and 
Forestry; Appropriations; Energy and Natural Resources; Environment and Public Works; 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions.209 Although these committees, and certainly others 




























encrusted  with  incomprehensible  jargon  dating  back  to  the  1930s 
makes it almost impossible for the average legislator to understand 















subsidies  fits  somewhat  awkwardly  with  the  fact  that  such  a  limited  subdivision  of 











partisan  split  that  sustains  the  agricultural  subsidy  regime,  and  as  I  have  described 
















corn  production,  but  rather  than  act  as  a  rational  economic  actor  to  correct  for  these 
externalities,  Congress  inexplicably  continues  to  actively  fund  and  perpetuate  them. 
                                                        
214  Matt  Yglesias,  Embracing  Regulatory  Capture,  Jan.  4  2011,  available  at 
http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/2011/01/embracing‐regulatory‐capture/  (describing  the  process  of 










problem  is  the  food  industry  itself.  The  politics  of  food  cannot  be  underestimated.”216 
















20,  2011,  available  at  http://www.npr.org/2011/01/20/133091250/Can‐Wal‐Mart‐Change‐Americas‐
Eating‐Habits.   58 
legally permissible forms of lobbying influence undermine the legitimacy of our democratic 
representative  institutions.218  The  perception  of  corruption  likewise  undermines 
democratic trust and has been cited as a major reason to reform existing campaign finance 
restrictions219  and  served  as  a  compelling  state  interest  in  the  Supreme  Court’s  First 
Amendment  since  Buckley  v.  Valeo.220  The  improved  access  that  lobbyists  have  to 
legislators, the financial dependencies that legislators develop on their largest campaign 















219  Jacob  Sullum,  The  Appearance  of  Corruption,  Reason  Magazine,  Dec.  2010,  available  at 
http://reason.com/archives/2010/11/30/the‐appearance‐of‐corruption  (noting  that  John  McCain  made 
eliminating the appearance of corruption a part of his 2000 campaign and when advocating for the eventual 
passage  of  the  McCain‐Feingold  Bipartisan  Campaign  Reform  Act  of  2002,  stating  for  example,  “It’s  the 
appearance that’s just as important.”). 





engineer  this  outcome.”222  It  is  no  coincidence  that  Butz’s  free  market  rhetoric  and 
admonition  to  “get  big  or  get  out”  aligned  so  closely  with  the  interests  of  the  nation’s 













223  Id.  The  following  passage  is  instructive  and  suggests  ADM  did  far  more  than  issue  public  statements 
favoring the administration’s deregulatory policies: “During the Watergate Investigation, Special Prosecutor 
Archibald Cox indicted then‐ADM CEO Dwayne Andreas for giving $100,000 in illegal contributions to Hubert 
Humphrey’s  1968  Presidential  campaign.  But  Andreas  was  nothing  if  not  bipartisan.  Richard  Nixon’s 
secretary Rose Mary Woods, testified that during Nixon’s 1972 campaign Andreas handed her an envelope 





































“ADM  and  ADMPAC,  a  political  action  committee  funded  by  our 
employees’ voluntary contributions, therefore support candidates for 
political  office  and  organizations  that  share  our  pro‐growth  vision, 
our  aspirations  for  the  future  of  global  agriculture,  and  our 








these  price  supports  have  been  similarly  impeded.  Lessig  also  observed  that  the  sugar 
industry  has  taken  an  approach  that  unwittingly  complements  the  corn  lobby  to  the 
detriment of the public’s health by seeking tariffs and legislation that will keep the cost of 
sugar  artificially  high,  a  practice  that  helped  entrench  HFCS  in  the  American  diet.  The 
















the  tobacco  litigation  experience  will  not  be  repeated  in  the  food 
industry. . . . Lobbying is taking place to urge states to enact laws that 
prevent  lawsuits  for  personal  injuries  related  to  obesity.  These 
“commonsense  consumption”  laws  would  place  accountability  for 
obesity  on  the  consumer,  making  it  more  difficult  to  sue  food 
manufacturers. . . .  .A number of advocacy groups, in particular, the 












prevent  a  worse  alternative  from  being  elected,  renders  effective  mobilization  of  the 
electorate  elusive.  This  should  serve  to  illustrate  what  I  meant  in  the  heading  of  this 
                                                        




















exists  also  exacerbates  America’s  epidemic  of  diabetes,  obesity,  and  coronary  diseases, 
contributes  massively  to  healthcare  costs,  lost  productivity,  and  other  inefficiencies 
associated with these conditions. The legislation also indirectly contributes to increases in 
the  price  of  fossil  fuels,  adds  deferred  costs  in  the  form  of  a  number  of  irreversible 
environmental  harms,  including  soil  erosion,  water  pollution,  global  warming,  and  the 
development  of  antibiotic  resistant  bacteria  associated  with  the  CAFO  farms  that  corn 
subsidization  has  rendered  profitable.  The  costs  of  this  legislation  also  include  the 
increased incidence of starvation, immigration, and political instability that are produced 
internationally,  all  of  which  over  time  impose  additional  costs  on  U.S.  taxpayers.  The 
combined costs are massive. 
The case for regulation here is far stronger than in areas where (forgive the pun) the 















near‐universally  reviled  market  distortions  have  grown  entrenched  and,  practically 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